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CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
Each of us, at some time or another, is consoled by the belief that 
some centralized power, be it a person, group or institution, is ably 
directing the complex systems that serve our society, and thus freeing us 
from the strenuous task of understanding the vast complexities of our 
institutions. In a benign and superficial sense, this myth of the "super 
competence" is akin to Ernst Cassirer's myth of the state for it directly 
affects our approach to reality. In part it is beneficial because it 
helps people believe that societY,is serving them. But the myth has its 
costs; to the "super compentence ll we willingly relinquish control. Occa-
sionally, our faith is shaken and we become angry or frightened -enough to do 
something . For example, the 1hree Mile Island nuclear power plant 
accident and the attendant efforts by many to comprehend the intricacies 
of nuclear power production have made us painfully aware that the mechanisms 
of control are not adequate. Although the multiple problems which exist 
in our health care system for the elderly do not have the dramatic impact 
of Three Mile ISland, sure.1y they present a comparable policy problem which 
must be solved to avoid increasing human misery. 
The time to consider our futures, who will care for us when we are the 
sick and the aged, is now! Today, the answer to that question is often the 
skilled nursing facility, the most expensive way for society to bundle off 
the chronic health problems associated with aging. As the elderly increase 
as a portion of the population, the increase in payments for LTC will cause 
a massive redistribution of wealth, far outstripping inheritance taxes and 
other mechanisms for transferring wealth from one generation to another. 
It will eat away at our national savings and the domino effect it generates 
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may affect the housing industry, industrial investments and other forms of 
industry reliant upon a ready supply of capital. 
Chapter I of the General Accounting Office report entitled, 1fEntering 
1 a Nursing Home - Costly Implications for Medicaid and the Elderly" relates 
the dizzying evolution of Medicaid and its relationship to LTC. The chapter 
starts by pointing out that when Medicaid was enacted in 1965 it was felt . 
that it would only give rise to modest increases in expenditure beyond the 
$1.3 billion cost of the vendor payment programs it replaced. Medicaid was 
activated in 1966; by 1968 the cost was $3.5 billion; by 1975 it was 
$12.5 billion; and by 1978 it was $18.6 billion. In 12 years Medicaid 
expenditures rose by 1330% above the 1966 base of $1.3 billion. Even 
accounting for inflation in the health area, the increase is in excess of 
1100%. 
There are several reasons for this growth in expenditure but the major 
one is the coverage of nursing ho~e care. A full $7.6 billion, or 41% of 
the 1978 Medicaid expenditure is for LTC. The Institute for Medicaid 
Management projects that the Medicaid expenditure for LTC should reach 
$9.4 billion by 1984. 2 Given the track record for estimating future 
expenditures in this area, one might guess that even this figure represents 
a rather conservative guess. 
If this expenditure trend continues, LTC will eventually become a 
burden our society will be unable to bear. By the early part of the 21st 
century, as the children of the post World War II baby boom move into the 
70's, the level of expenditures will be so high that services may have to 
lGeneral Accounting Office, Entering a Nursing Home - Costly Implications for 
Medicaid and the Elderly, November 26, 1979, pp 1-15. 
2Institute for Medicaid Management, Data on the Medicaid Program: Eligibility/ 
Services/Expenditures, Fiscal Years 1966-78, DHEW, Washington, D.C., 1978. 
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undergo a forced reduction at the very time when consumer demand will be 
most intense. If we cannot control the LTC system within the next twenty 
years, the stage will be set for a significant decrease in the living 
standard for the elderly, the possibility of passive euthanasia as a pro-
grammatic necessity, and the probability of wide spread misery for our 
elderly. 
Not only is LTC excessively expensive, but the system which has 
evolved to care for the sick and the aged is excessively complex. At the 
root of the problem of escalating costs and control is our health care 
policy process itself. Historically, the "Great American Policy Compro-
mise" has involved giving the political liberals their pet programs and 
helping the conservatives lick their political wounds by letting distant 
state governments run many of the programs. Many "short circuit" devices 
have been tried to foil the great policy compromise. Lyndon Johnson IS 
"creative" federalism sent aid directly to the distressed cities and even 
to community groups looking for innovation and effectiveness. Richard 
Nixon1s "newH federalism gave local jurisdictions new freedom within the 
framework of bloc grants so that they might do what the idiosyncratic 
local political structure might want most. However, both left unchanged 
the policy compromise struck in 1965 with regard to health care. In this 
compromise, most of the health care power went to the states. 
In response to the confusion and disarray caused by the federal/state 
compromise, the PMS has tackled the very basic questions of LTC - who shall 
adrniniste~ finance, structure services, regulate and allocate values for 
LTC? Our answer is not yet another IInew" federalism or a return to the 
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halcyon days of state independence. Our conclusion is that we must 
reassess the LTC system in its entirety, considering all incentives and 
values. 
As Sandra Caccamise has stated in her chapter on the administration 
of LTC, the present structure depends upon an unenthusastic "partnership" 
among federal, state and local units of government. In reality, LTC is 
rendered by governments, by the private non-profit sector and by the 
private sector. To the states go the tasks of partially funding, regu-
lating, setting standards, and encouraging innovation for LTC. Although 
the federal government assumes the role of technical advisor for these 
functions, its real task is to provide dollars. 
The next thirty years of LTC regulation will see the federal government 
breaking out of the pattern set by the llGreat American Policy Compromise ll ; 
it will dramatically increase its authority and powers. While it is 
improbable that the diffuse LTC system could be federalized, some of the 
PMS seminar participants saw greater federal participation even to the extent 
of direct participation in administering a small percentage of special 
purpose and pilot long term ca~e facilities. The federal role and span 
of control will increase, but so will that of the states. New York State 
is committed to the regulation of LTC perhaps to a greater extent than most 
states and will become a national model. The PMS seminar noted that the 
level of state intervention in long term care will escalate, especially as 
more and more legislatures struggle to understand and get control over their 
own Medicaid programs. 
The increasingly important roles of the federal and state governments 
is merely part of the present trend. We hope to see other administrative 
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structures eventually replace both the state and the federal government in 
LTC because both represent illogical outposts from which to run LTC. 
Various levels of government inherited LTC by default, an uneasy partnership 
developed, growth was uncontrolled, costs zoomed - the system was out of 
whack primarily because no one was clearly in control. This situation 
leads us back to the all important question, "Who will take care of me in 
2020?" 
We ask you, the reader, to speculate upon the solutions presented 
here. Perhaps, the answer can be found in one of the ideas included in 
this paper. Perhaps these solutions can provide a starting point, a base 
upon which to build sound cost containment strategies, levels of care, 
central screening mechanisms, and reimbursement procedures. Perhaps 
we will have to find other solutions, not suggested herein. We feel we 
have fulfilled our responsibilities just by raising the question of our 
needs with regard to LTC. We propose no miracles in this modest little 
monograph, but we hope that when the bell tolls for the LTC of the post-
war baby boom, it will not signal the bankruptcy of society also . 
